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THE COURTS, AS CONSERVATORS OF
SOCIAL JUSTICE.-
The better security of social justice is the main aim of modern
political institutions. The paternalism of older forms of govern-
ment guarded it fairly, provided there were a good and wise king.
But good and wise kings were rare. Absolute monarchies, there-
fore, as soon as it became generally admitted that governments
existed for the benefit of the governed, had to give place to consti-
tutional monarchies or to republics. It was easy to write into
constitutions declarations as to certain things which social justice
demanded, and prohibitions against legislation to the contrary.
But the whole field was not thus covered. The constitution might
warrant the judiciary in holding a statute void which fell within
one of the particular prohibitions; but how if it were legislation
plainly contrary to what seems to be natural right, and yet that
should not have been expressly forbidden?
There can be found not a few assertions in our reports by
American Judges that, in such case, the judiciary could declare
it void; but it is believed that, so far as they assert it as a principle
needing no support from constitutional provisions, all these are
obiter dicta.2
It is the object of this paper to discuss the bearing on this ques-
tion of certain constitutional provisions serving, in effect, to con-
firm the existence of such a power in the judiciary.
These are three:
i. Those against deprivation of life, liberty or property with-
out due process of law.
'In preparing this paper free use has been made of an address deliv-
ered by the author before the Maryland State Bar Association, on July 8,
rgog, on "The New Reading of Due Process of Law."
'Thayer's Cases on Constitutional Law, I, 53.
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2. Those granting, in general terms, the legislative power of
the State to a legislative body.
3. That as to the guaranty by the United States to each State
of a republican form of government.
i. DuE PROCESS Ov LAW.
Quietly laid away in the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution
of the United States slept for more than a century, almost in the
sleep of death, the mandate of the American people that no person
shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law.
The phrase "due process of law" first appears in American con-
stitutional history in the amendments to this Constitution in the
nature of a Bill of Rights, proposed in 1788 by some of the States
in connection with their votes of ratification. Among these, (24
in number, altogether) 3 was one, emanating from New York, to
the effect "that no person ought to be taken, imprisoned, or dis-
seized of his freehold, or be exiled or deprived of his privileges,
franchises, life, liberty, or property, but by due process of law."
Virginia and North Carolina each proposed one quite similar in
terms, except that, adhering more closely to the phraseology of
Magna Charta, they substituted for the closing words, "but by the
law of the land."
In none of the Constitutions-eleven in all-adopted by the
several States before the Federal Constitution went into effect is
the expression "due process of law" to be found.4 Madison in-
corporated it in the draft of such amendments to the Constitu-
tion of the United States as he thought desirable, which he pre-
sented to the first Congress, using the precise words finally in-
corporated in the Fifth Amendment.5 The framers of the New
York amendments no doubt took it from a legislative Declaration
of Rights adopted by her Assembly in January, 1787, and its use
there was based on the terms of the Petition of Right approved
by Charles I in 1628.
'Report of the Am. Hist. Association for 1896, II, 183.
'In five of these (those of New Hampshire, New York, Pennsylvania,
South Carolina and Virginia) the provisions in Magna Charta that no.
man should be proceeded against by the Crown to the loss of life, liberty
or property, but by the legal judgment of his peers or the law of the
land was substantially reproduced. In that of North Carolina, they were
reproduced with the omission of the reference to the judgment of his-
peers. New Jersey, Delaware and Georgia made no provision whatever
of such a kind. Connecticut and Rhode Island did not adopt Constitu-
tions until the following century.
'Thorpe, Constitutional History of the United States, II, 216.
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The phrase, however, goes back to the fourteenth century. It
first appears, so far as I have been able to ascertain, in an Act of
Parliament passed in 1355 (28 Edward III, Chapter 3) which pro-
vides that no man should be disseized, taken, imprisoned, disin-
1herited, or put to death, without being sent to answer by due proc-
ess of law; or, to quote the original Norman French, "sauns estre
mesne en respons par due proces de lei."
It will be recollected that it was customary in the ancient Par-
liaments to accompany each enactment with a statement of the
reasons for asking the Crown to assent to it. The particular
grievance specified in the chapter mentioned in the statute of 28
Edward III, in this connection, was that divers subjects had of
late been imprisoned without any cause shown, and to writs of
habeas corpus duly issued the only return was that they were de-
tained by command of the privy council, and they were thereupon
"returned back to their several prisons, without being charged with
anything to which they might make answer according to law."
The great mischief to be remedied was unlawful deprivations
of liberty, without legal process, and in defiance of the power of
the courts to give a remedy by habeas corpus proceedings.
Three years before, another Act had been assented to by the
same sovereign which may serve as a further interpreter. The
Parliament from which it proceeded began the session with obtain-
ing one of the many confirmations of Magna Charta granted by
Edward III. It was then (25 Edward III, V, Chapter IV) enacted
that "no one shall be ousted of his franchises or freehold, if he be
not duly brought in to answer and forejudged thereof by way of
law," or in the words of the original, "s'il ne soit mesne duernent en
respons & forfugge dyceles par voie de lei."
Obviously here the guaranty was of due proceedings, afford-
ing a fair opportunity to answer, and a judgment such as the law
of the land demanded.
Sir Edward Coke, in commenting on the phrase "per legemn
terra-" in Magna Charta, observed that it meant "by due
course and processe of law," that is by due presentment or
indictment and being brought in to answer thereto by due process
of the common law." Following this line of thought, Story, in
his Commentaries on the Constitution,7 says that the words "due
process of law" in the Fifth Amendment were meant to affirm, in
'2 Inst., 44, 50, 51, 52.
II, § 1783.
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effect, the right of trial according to the process and proceedings
of the Common Law.
The remarks of Coke are especially noteworthy because made
in the second volume of his Institutes, a commentary on Magna
Charta, published in 1642, by direction of the Long Parliament.
He undoubtedly used his opportunity to read into the charter much
of the law that had been developed long after 1215,8 but in this
instance he narrows rather than enlarges the meaning of the
terms employed.
For their true sense and meaning, he says, we must look to
another statute of the same King, passed in 1363, in which they
are explained as meaning without due process of law.
This Act (37 Edward III, Chapter 18) recites that "though it
be contained in the Great Charter that no man be taken nor im-
prisoned, nor put out of his freehold, without process of the law,
nevertheless divers people make false suggestion to the King him-
self," and it is therefore enacted that those making false sugges-
tions should receive the same punishment to which he whom they
accused would have been subject, and that in such case this should
not be deemed process of the law made against them contrary to
the charter. It will be seen that the word "due" is not used in the
statute to qualify process, although Coke treats the matter as if it
were. But with or without this word, the natural meaning is the
same.
Selden, in the great parliamentary debates which accompanied
the Petition of Right, asserted that as early as 1331 (5 Edward
III) a petition preferred by Parliament to the King stated that
"in Magna Charta it is contained, That none be imprisoned but
by due process of law," but added that these words were not, in
fact, to be found in it. Another participant in the discussion stated
that they were used in the Statute of Explanations (6 Edward I),
in 1278.9 In the ordinary editions of the English statutes at large,
however, no such phrases are recorded in the legislation of those
years.
It is to be noted that the words of Magna Charta, as revised by
Parliament under Henry III (1225), assume not only a judgment,
but a legal judgment ;--"per legale judicium parium suorum, vel
per legem terr,.-' Commentators have asserted that vel is here
used in the sense of et. A much simpler construction would seem
8McKechnie, Magna Charta, 208.
'Rushworth, Historical Collections, 56.3, 568.
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to be to leave the second clause of the sentence alternative, as it
stands, but to take it as another way of defining the condemnatory
judgment. In the first clause it is described as being a legal one: in
the second it is described as one rendered by the law of the land,
as if it had been said "by a legal judgment of his peers," or in other
words, "by a judgment of his peers rendered in accordance with
the law of the land." What was secured was adherence to estab-
lished rules for judicial proceedings.
Another interpretation, which has the high authority of Hallam
and Reeves, is that the judicium parium was often used in contra-
distinction from the decision by battle, or ordeal, though the latter
was equally sanctioned by the lex terre. Yet another, favored by
Pollock and Maitland in their History of English Law, is that the
barons were particularly concerned to prevent any of their order
from being judged by his inferiors in rank sitting as Justices on
the bench of the King's Court.
But whichever view may be adopted, the original purpose of
these phrases was simply to secure to every man a right to the
protection of the settled rules established for the administration of
justice.
Glanvil, in speaking for the Commons, in 1628 (May 23), be-
fore a joint committee of Parliament raised to consider the form
of the Petition of Right, said that the words per legale judicium
parium suorum vel per legem terrc by laws of Edward III, "are
expounded to import that none should be put to answer without
Presentment or matter of Record, or by due Process, or Writ Orig-
inal; and if otherwise, it should be void, and holden for error." .0
The error, it will be noted, is an error of a processual nature,
and that alone. It is a defect of legal procedure. What that
term means has never been more clearly defined than by Lord
Justice Lush. It is, he says in one of his opinions, "the mode of
proceeding by which a legal right is enforced, as distinguished from
the law which gives or defines the right, and which by means of
the proceeding the Court is to administer ;--the machinery, as dis-
tinguished from its product." "1
The main purpose of the clause of Magna Charta which we
have under consideration, (Chap. 29) was to forbid the Crown
thereafter, in Crown cases, "to place execution before judgment."12
"Rushworth, Historical Collections, 568, 579.
UPoyser v. Minors (1881) L. R. 7 Q. B. Div. 329, 333.
'McKechnie, Magna Charta, 437, 438, 442; Thayer, Preliminary
Treatise on Evidence, 65.
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The subsidiary purposes were that the judgment must be by a
man's peers, Jews for Jews, nobles for nobles, Crown tenants by
Crowfl tenants, manorial under tenants by manorial under tenants
in the Court baron; and that there must be an opportunity to de-
fend by the methods then in use, that is, by battle, ordeal, or per-
haps by compurgation. The lex terra, which the barons had in
mind at Runnymede was the law of judicial procedure in causes
between King and subject. The same purpose actuated the Par-
liament which, a hundred and forty years later, obtained from
Edward III the more explicit guaranty of due process of law.
There was need of greater explicitness, for writs had often been
issued with a special reservation of a power of arbitrary arrest by
the Crown or the Chief Justiciary.13
Similar acts on his part led Parliament to call for the renewal
of the guaranty by Charles I.
Was it necessary for the people of the United States to secure
themselves in like manner against the new government which they
were creating? In the Convention of 1787, which framed the
Constitution, the vote of a majority of the States could not be
obtained in favor of anything in the nature of a Bill of Rights.'
It was in the main those who had been unfriendly to anything
stronger than a Union of States, whose efforts secured the adop-
tion of the first ten amendments.
The guaranty of due process of law before any person could
be deprived of life, liberty, or property, being taken from the
Petition of Right, may fairly be assumed to have been intended
by Madison and those who voted with him in the first Congress
to carry the meaning which it had there, except so far as it
was directed, not, as in England, against the Executive alone, but
against each department of the government alike. Coke's reading
was no doubt accepted by all who gave the matter any real atten-
tion. 5 This it is probable that few did. The importance of the
first ten amendments was underestimated by the Federalists, and
when they were proposed to the States most of the leading public
men were of that political school. Gouverneur Morris, who had
taken so active a part in the Constitutional Convention of 1787,
said of them, in 1811, that considerate men "never believed the
"Mirrour of Justice, V, § i, No. 63, §§ 2, 7.
"M]liott's Debates, V, 538.
'Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Co. (U. S. 1855) i8 Hov. 272, 276.
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amendments gave any additional security to life, liberty, or prop-
erty." 16
A quarter of a century after their ratification, and when their
significance had become more fully recognized, Kent in his Com-
mentaries17 said, "the better and larger definition of due process
of law is that it means law in the regular course of administration
through courts of justice." This opens the door to a new field.
The individual has the right to claim the benefit of a certain law.
That he claims it in the course of court proceedings does not
limit its scope to court proceedings.
Another quarter of a century passed and Kent's definition was
substantially adopted by the Court of Appeals of New York. A
legacy to a married woman was claimed by her under a statute
passed after the testator died. By the pre-existing law it belonged
to her husband, and he asserted that to deprive him of it was to
take his property without due process of law. The question arose
in the settlement of the estate of the testator before the Surrogate.
On appeal, it was held, under the Constitution of New York, that
the statute could not deprive him of his vested rights, because it
was not "due process of law." 18
The principle here involved was that no man could be deprived
of his property by the act of the government, unless he had legally
forfeited it, or unless it were taken for public use on just com-
pensation. It was not a question of legal process, but of substan-
tive right.
A quarter of a century later, Chief Justice Cooley, in his Con-
stitutional Limitations, 9 adopted this view as the true one. "Due
process of law," he observes, "in each particular case means such
an exertion of the powers of government as the settled maxims
of law permit and sanction, and under such safeguards for the
protection of individual rights as those maxims prescribe for the
class of cases to which the one in question belongs." Here "proc-
ess of law" is treated as something quite other than "process in
court." Any act of government is forbidden which violates a per-
sonal right. "Due process of law," with reference to a statute,
means due exercise of legislative power, and any exercise of legis-
lative power is undue which is not reasonably consistent with the
"Diary and Letters, II, 530.
ITI, 624.
'Westervelt v. Gregg (1854) 2 Kernan (12 N. Y.) 202, 212.
19Chap. XI, page 434.
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settled maxims of Anglo-American law touching the security of
life, liberty, or property.
In 1869, the Supreme Court of the United States, for the first
time, I believe, ranged itself among the supporters of this doctrine,
in the case of Hepburn v. Griswold.20 The Legal Tender Act, it
was held, if effectual as to creditors, who at the time of its passage
were entitled to payment in gold, would deprive them of property
without due process of law. In the Legal Tender Cases,21 of the
following year, which overruled Hepburn v. Griswold, this con-
struction of the Constitution was not repudiated.
A disposition to take a narrower ground is observable in the
case of Davidson v. New Orleans, decided in 1877.2 By this time
the effects of the inclusion of a similar provision in the Fourteenth
Amendment, directed against action by the States, were beginning
to appear. Originally intended there for the protection of the
negro, it was soon discovered that it gave new guaranties to every
person in the United States. To extend its application has ever
since been the common study of the American bar.
The general government, in time of peace at least, seldom has
occasion or opportunity to invade the domain of individual right.
The States, occupying a much broader field than the United States,
are under a constant temptation to do so, under the impulse of a
spirit of reform and altruism. To guard against their yielding to
such influences has become, during the past thirty years, the fre-
quent task of the federal judiciary, and it has naturally tended to
a broader interpretation of the constitutional guaranty.23
It was the subject of close examination by the Supreme Court
of the United States, in Hurtado v. California and, in summing
up, their opinion states that "due process of law" in the Four-
teenth Amendment "refers to that law of the land in each State,
which derives its authority from the inherent and reserved powers
of the State, exerted within the limits of those fundamental prin-
ciples of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil
and political institutions, and the greatest security for which re-
sides in the right of the people to make their own laws, and alter
them at their pleasure." 24
208 Wall. 603, 624.
Z (I87O) 12 Wall. 457, 551, 580.
296 U. S. 97, 1O1-105.
'Sinking Fund Cases (1878) 99 U. S. 70o; United States v. Lee
(1882) io6 U. S. 196, 218. Cf., however, Ex parte Wall (1882) l07 U. S.
265, 289; Holden v. Hardy (1898) 169 U. S. 366, 387.
.4(1884) 110 U. S. 516, 535.
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Here again will be noticed the recurrence of the general decla-
ration that it is a substantive, rather than a processual right, which
is secured.
In a more recent case the doctrine, advancing on the same lines,
was applied to the power of a State to tax the tangible personal
property of its citizens, wherever situated. The general rule of
International Private Law had affirmed the existence of this
power.2 5 In Union Transit Co. v. Kentucky,28 a statute of Ken-
tucky imposing such a tax on a Kentucky corporation on account
of movable personal property, which it kept for permanent use in
other States, was held to be void because to tax such property was
in effect to take it without due process of law. Mr. Justice Holmes
observed, in a five-line dissenting opinion, that the result reached
was probably a desirable one, but that neither he nor the Chief
justice could understand how it could be deduced from the Four-
teenth Amendment.
The State courts, if not going quite as far as the Kentucky
tax case, have generally sympathized with this new reading of
"Due Process of Law."
It is, however, to say the least, questionable if it finds support
in legal history, and takes the words of our Constitutions and con-
stitutional amendments in the sense intended by the men who put
them there. It may, indeed, well be doubted if those men would
ever have used these words, had they thought them to bear the
meaning now attributed to them.
In Twining v. New Jersey27 there is an intimation that the
Supreme Court of the United States is not insensible to the gravity
of this historical question.
"Is it," said Mr. Justice Moody, of a claim to exemption from
compulsory self-incrimination, "a fundamental principle of liberty
and justice which inheres in the very idea of free government
and is the inalienable right of a citizen of such a government?
If it is, and it is of a nature that pertains to process of law, this
court has declared it to be essential to due process of law."
In other words, it may not be enough, under the Fourteenth
Amendment, to justify holding a statute of a State to be void, that
it violates a fundamental principle of liberty and justice which is
the inalienable right of each of its citizens, unless that right be of
a nature that pertains to process of law.
'Wharton, Conflict of Laws (3d Ed.) I, § 8o, a.
'(195o) 199 U. S. 194, 202.
'(1908) 2ri U. S. 78, io6.
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2. THE GRANT op LEGISLATIVE POWER.
The State Constitutions, in creating the legislative department,
generally use the phrase that "the legislative power of the State
is hereby vested" in a legislative body, of a form described.
What is meant by this term "legislative power of the State"?
Surely only such as the authorities of the State can legitimately
exercise.
In Calder v. Bull,28 Mr. Justice Chase described it thus:
"The purposes for which men enter into society will determine
the nature and terms of the social compact; and as they are the
foundation of the legislative power, they will decide what are the
proper objects of it: the nature and ends of legislative power will
limit the exercise of it. This fundamental principle flows from
the very nature of our free Republican governments, that no man
should be compelled to do what the laws do not require; nor to
refrain from acts which the laws permit. There are acts which
the Federal, or State, Legislature cannot do, without exceeding
their authority. There are certain vital principles in our free
Republican governments, which will determine and overrule an
apparent and flagrant abuse of legislative power; as to authorize
manifest injustice by positive law; or to take away that security
for personal liberty, or private property, for the protection whereof
the government was established. An Act of the Legislature (for
I cannot call it a law) contrary to the great first principles of the
social compact, cannot be considered a rightful exercise of legisla-
tive authority. The obligation of a law in governments established
on express compact, and on republican principles, must be deter-
mined by the nature of the power on which it is founded. A
few instances will suffice to explain what I mean. A law that
punished a citizen for an innocent action, or, in other words, for
an act, which, when done, was in violation of no existing law; a
law that destroys, or impairs, the lawful private contracts of citi-
zens; a law that makes a man a Judge in his own cause; or a law
that takes property from A and gives it to B: It is against all
reason and justice, for a people to entrust a Legislature with such
powers; and, therefore, it cannot be presumed that they have done
it. The genius, the nature, and the spirit, of our State govern-
ments, amount to a prohibition of such acts of legislation; and the
general principles of law and reason forbid them. The Legislature
may enjoin, permit, forbid, and punish; they may declare new
crimes; and establish rules of conduct for all its citizens in future
cases; they may command what is right, and prohibit what is
wrong; but they cannot change innocence into guilt; or punish
innocence as a crime; or violate the right of an antecedent lawful
private contract; or the right of private property. To maintain
that our Federal, or State, Legislature possesses such powers, if
(1i798) 3 Dallas 386, 388.
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they had not been expressly restrained, would, in my opinion, be
a political heresy, altogether inadmissible in our free republican
governments."
Few cases have excited more public interest than those turning
on the validity of the Georgia grants of the last decade of the
eighteenth century, by which large areas of State lands were trans-
ferred to companies of speculators. The grants were procured
by fraud. The legislature passed an Act annulling them for this
cause. But the rights of bona fide purchasers from the original
grantees were involved. The Act, if valid, destroyed a vested right
resting on an executed contract. In Fletcher v. Peck these ques-
tions came for final determination before the Supreme Court of the
United States, which held,
"that the State of Georgia was restrained either by general
principles which are common to our free institutions, or by
the particular provisions of the Constitution of the United
States" from passing the statute under consideration. "It
may well be doubted," said Marshall, in pronouncing the final opin-
ion, "whether the nature of society and of government does not pre-
scribe some limits to the legislative power, and if any be prescribed,
where are they to be found, if the property of an individual, fairly
and honestly acquired, may be seized without compensation? To
the legislature all legislative power is granted; but the question
whether the act of transferring the property of an individual to
the public be in the nature of legislative power is well worthy of
serious reflection." 29
In an opinion by that great jurist, judge Ranney, after refer-
ring to the provision of the Ohio Constitution vesting "the legis-
lative power" of the State in the General Assembly, he thus defines
the extent of the grant:
"Unlike the Constitution of the United States, and from the
necessity of the case, no attempt at a specific enumeration of the
items of legislative power is made. This must therefore always
be determined from the nature of the power exercised. If it is
found to fall within the general terms of the grant, we can only
look to the other parts of the constitution for limitations upon it:
if none are found, none exist. But as the General Assembly, like
the other departments of government, exercises only a delegated
authority, it cannot be doubted that any Act passed by it, not
falling fairly within the scope of legislative power, is as clearly
void as though expressly prohibited." 3 0
Here it is assumed as too clear for argument, that the general
term "legislative power of the State" is subject to an implied re-
striction that makes it cover only what is fairly within the scope
'(i8io) 6 Cranch 87.
'Cincinniati, etc. R. R. Co. v. Commissioners (1852) I Ohio St.
77, 86.
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of a delegated power of that description; and that whether a par-
ticular statute comes fairly within that scope may present a proper
question for judicial determination.
A similar view was taken by the Supreme Court of the United
States in the great case of Loan Association v. Topeka.' This is
not that a court of justice, unaided by any constitutional provision,
may by its inherent powers treat a statute which seems to it fla-
grantly unjust as void; but that an American court may properly
assume that function because it is aided by constitutional pro-
visions, which imply certain limitations on legislative power.3 2
There were, said Mr. Justice Miller, in giving the opinion of
the court, some rights in every free government which were be-
yond the control of the State, and which could not be impaired by
the exercise of that power.
"The theory," he added, "of our governments, State and Na-
tional, is opposed to the deposit of unlimited power anywhere.
The executive, the legislative, and the judicial branches of these
governments are of limited and defined powers. There are limita-
tions on such power which grow out of the essential nature of all
free governments." * * * "To lay with one hand the power
of the government on the property of the citizen, and with the other
to bestow it upon favored individuals to aid private enterprises
and build up private fortunes, is none the less a robbery because it
is done under the forms of law and is called taxation. This is
not legislation. It is a decree under legislative forms."
These opinions, it will be noticed, rely solely on the implica-
tions from the general nature and objects of free governments
as serving to limit that legislative power which a State can exer-
cise and therefore can be deemed to have granted to its legislative
department. They pay no regard to the effect of the express pro-
vision in the federal Constitution, fortifying this view, which is
next to be considered.
3. Tn- GUARANTY OF A REPUBLICAN FORM OF GOVERNMI ENT.
The provision in Sec. 4, Art. i, of the Constitution of the United
States, that "the United States shall guarantee to every State in
this Union a Republican Form of Government," has hardly re-
ceived the attention which it deserves, in respect to the light which
it serves to throw on the question under discussion.
In the earlier articles of that instrument, its framers had put
certain particular limitations on the legislative power of the States,
"(i874) 2o Wall. 655, 662, 663, 664.
'See a comment on this case in State v. Travelers Insurance Co.
(19oo) 73 Conn. 255, 286.
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such as the prohibition against the issue of paper money as a
legal tender, and of bills of attainder. The makers of the early
State Constitutions had also put into them certain particular limi-
tations on the power of their legislatures. But in addition to all
these was framed this new guaranty, in general terms, of a repub-
lican form of government.
It laid down an express rule of duty for the United States. It
implied a commensurate rule of duty for each State and the proper
authorities of each State.
A guaranty imports the existence of a principal obligation. The
primary duty rests upon the State. Its authority must be exer-
cised under republican forms. Its Judges, under their oath to sup-
port the Constitution of the United States, must recognize and re-
spect, in-the decision of causes, this fundamental obligation. Aris-
ing by necessary implication, it stands on the same footing as would
an express provision of the Constitution of the United States that
every State in the Union shall always maintain a republican form
of government.
The more one studies this clause of guaranty, the more is felt
the far-reaching force of what it necessarily implies.
The position on which the decisions heretofore quoted have been
based that the nature of a free government necessarily imposed cer-
tain limitations on its legislative power, and that our American
State governments were free, is obviously strengthened when due
weight is given to what is tantamount to an express constitutional
requirement that no State can do any act inconsistent with the
essential nature of a republic.
And what is that?
John Adams made this observation in one of his letters to
Samuel Adams:
"It is a fixed principle with me that all good government is and
must be republican. But, at the same time, your candor will agree
with me, that there is not in lexicography a more fraudulent word.
Whenever I use the word republic with approbation, I mean a
government in which the people have, collectively or by represen-
tation, an essential share in the sovereignty."33
In a letter written the year before to Roger Sherman, he had
defined the word more briefly as "a government whose sover-
eignty is vested in more than one person" and included England
'Life and Works of John Adams, VI, 415.
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in that class. 34  Sherman differed from him, and explained the
word as signifying to him
tea government under the authority of the people, consisting of
legislative, executive, and judiciary powers; the legislative powers
vested in an assembly, consisting of one or more branches who,
together with the executive, are appointed by the people, and de-
pendent on them for continuance, by periodical elections, agree-
ably to an established constitution." 35
Sherman's definition probably expresses the thought of the day
more clearly as well as more fully than that of Adams, but both
rested on certain general doctrines then taken as political axioms.
All were agreed that no government could be deemed republican
in form, in which the entire powers of sovereignty were delegated,
without limitation, to a single ruler or a single body of men. They
must be to some extent divided. Most of them also agreed that
these powers must to some extent be reserved, and undelegated.
The men who gathered at Philadelphia in 1787 to frame the
Constitution of the United States, and the people who afterwards
ratified it, certainly had, in whatever they did, two main aims, and
expressed them plainly in its preamble :-to "establish Justice" and
to "secure the Blessings of Liberty" to themselves and their pos-
terity. They were building on the foundation of the Declaration
of Independence, and had not forgotten its assertion that govern-
ments are instituted to secure certain unalienable rights belonging
to all men alike, and that among these are life, liberty, and the pur-
suit of happiness.
This Declaration is one of our muniments of title. The Con-
stitution leans upon it and can only be understood by entering
into its spirit. Chief Justice Waite, at the close of the first century
of our national existence, based one of the great judgments of the
Supreme Court of the United States largely on the force of its
assertions.
"The rights of life," he said, speaking for the court, "and per-
sonal liberty are natural rights of man. 'To secure these rights,'
says the Declaration of Independence, 'governments are insti-
tuted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent
of the governed.' The very highest duty of the States, when they
entered into the Union under the Constitution, was to protect all
persons within their boundaries in the enjoyment of these 'unalien-
able rights with which they were endowed by their Creator.'
Sovereignty, for this purpose, rests alone with the States." ss
'Life and Works of John Adams, VI, 428.
"Ibid, 437.
'U. S. v. Cruikshank (1875) 92 U. S. 542, 553.
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John Adams once complained that Jefferson received all the
credit for the definition of the inherent rights of Americans in the
Declaration of Independence, although he (Adams), two years
earlier, had stated them in almost the same terms in the "Declara-
tions and Resolves" of the first Continental Congress.37 There
they were founded inter alia on "the immutable Laws of Nature"
and "the Principles of the English Constitution."
John Locke was regarded throughout the American colonies
as a high authority. His views permeate the Massachusetts Con-
stitution of 178o, which more than any other influenced the makers
of the federal Constitution, and the Abb6 de Mably observed, in
1783, with regard to the former and the Constitutions of New
York and Pennsylvania as well, that their framers adopted his
"true and wise principles as to the natural liberty of Man and the
nature of government." 38 These included the "social com-
pact" as the foundation of civil authority, and freedom, equality,
and independence as the original condition of those who entered
into it.
Modern philosophy may refuse to acknowledge that such prin-
ciples exist, and declare that history and biology leave them without
support. Well founded or ill founded, however, they exist for us,
by reason of their recognition in our constitutional documents.
Man, in some future state of society, may deny any right of private
property, but for Americans it will continue in full force until they
alter the Constitution of the United States.
Categorically stated, the proposition now under discussion is
this :--A grant by the Constitution of a State to its legislature
of all the legislative power of the State conveys only such power
as can be legitimately exercised in the form of legislation, and to
learn what powers can be thus legitimately exercised, courts in
cases coming before them have a right to look to the general prin-
ciples which are common to our free institutions under republican
governments.
Daniel Webster, arguendo, made this point very clearly in
Wilkinson v. Leland." It was claimed on the other side that a
statute of Rhode Island, on which they relied, (and which in ef-
'
TOct. 14, 1774. Journals of Congress, I, 27.
'Oeuvres completes, XVI, 113.
'(1829) 2 Peters 627, 644, 657.
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fect took property of A and gave it to B) was valid because the
legislature of that State was unrestrained by any State Constitu-
tion.
"It would be well," he replied, "to consider how Rhode Island
can be a member of this union, with such a form of government as
is asserted to exist there. By the constitution of the United States,
every state must be a republic, every state must have a judiciary,
legislature and executive, or it has no constitution. It is said that
Rhode Island has no constitution; that she has grown up without
a constitution. If her government has no form, it cannot be a
republic, and has no right to come into the union."
Mr. Justice Story, in giving the opinion of the court, took a
view substantially similar.
"The fundamental maxims of a free government," he said,
'seem to require that the rights of personal liberty and private
property should be held sacred. At least no court of justice in
this country would be warranted in assuming, that the power to
violate and disregard them,-a power so repugnant to the com-
mon principles of justice and civil liberty,-lurked under any gen-
eral grant of legislative authority, or ought to be implied from
any general expressions of the will of the people. The people
ought not to be presumed to part with rights so vital to their
security and well-being, without very strong and direct expressions
of such an intention. In Terret v. Taylor, 9 Cranch 43, it was
held by this Court, that a grant or title to lands once made by the
legislature to any person or corporation is irrevocable, and cannot
be reassumed by any subsequent legislative act; and that a different
doctrine is utterly inconsistent with the great and fundamental
principle of a republican government, and with the right of the
citizens to the free enjoyment of their property lawfully acquired.
We know of no case in which a legislative act to transfer the prop-.
erty of A to B without his consent, has ever been held a constitu-
tional exercise of legislative power in any state in the union. On
the contrary, it has been constantly resisted as inconsistent withjust principles, by every judicial tribunal in which it has been at-
tempted to be enforced. We are not prepared therefore to admit
that the people of Rhode Island have ever delegated to their legis-
lature the power to divest the vested rights of property, and trans-
fer them without the assent of the parties."
In Allvn's Appeal, the opinion, following this line of thought,
contains these words:
"Our Constitution (Article 3, § I) vests the legislative power of
this State in the General Assembly. That power covers the whole
field of legitimate legislation, except so far as limitations are to be
found in other provisions of this Constitution or in that of the
United States. The latter provides (Article 4, § 4) that the
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'United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a
Republican Form of Government.' Connecticut is therefore im-
pliedly bound forever to maintain such a form of government.
She put her legislative power in the hands of the General Assem-
bly. She put only, because she could put only, such power of that
nature as was consistent with a republican form of government." 40
The opinion has been advanced that the enforcement of this
constitutional guaranty belongs only to the legislative department.
But its language is that "The United States shall guarantee to
every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government."
It is not that Congress shall guarantee it. The United States
do. In Luther v. Borden41 the Supreme Court of the United States
declared that it rested with Congress to decide, in case of con-
flict between two so-called governments of a State, which was the
established one; and further, that if any State should set up a mili-
tary rule as its permanent form of government, it would be the
duty of Congress to overthrow it. The only question to be deter-
mined in that cause, however, was whether, Congress having au-
thorized the President, in case of an insurrection in any State, to
call forth the militia on application of the State government, and
the President, on application of the Executive of one of two so-
called governments of the State of Rhode Island, having recog-
nized him as the head of the lawful and established government,
and taken measures to call out the militia to support his authority,
if necessary, this recognition did not settle the rightfulness of the
government conclusively, so far as the courts of the United States
were concerned. This was purely a political question, and there-
fore one that it belonged to the legislative or executive depart-
ments, or both, to decide. But it would seem that the different
question, whether statutes or executive orders which have pro-
ceeded from the confessedly established government in any State
were legally inconsistent with a republican form of government,
must be one of judicial cognizance.
Texas v. White must be considered as qualifying to some ex-
tent the broad statement in Luther v. Borden that the enforcement
of this particular guaranty belonged to Congress.
Texas, on February 15th, 1867, filed an original bill in the
Supreme Court of the United States against certain private indi-
viduals. They, in their answer, challenged her existence as a State.
In June, I865, the President had appointed a provisional Governor
'Allyn's Appeal (igo9) 8I Conn. 534; 71 Ati. 794.41(1849) 7 How. 1, 42, 44.
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for the State of Texas and directed the formation by her people
of a State government, through a Constitutional Convention. Such
a convention was soon held, the previously existing Constitution
amended, and elections ordered in 1866, under which a Governor
was elected. Under his directions the suit was instituted. On
March 2, 1867, an Act of Congress was passed, declaring this gov-
ernment of Texas an illegal one and provisional only, to be con-
tinued, if at all, only by direction of the military power of the
United States. A military Governor was thereupon appointed, who
ratified the institution of the suit.
The court held that, whether or not the Act of March 2, 1867,
was in all respects constitutional, Texas was a State when the ac-
tion was brought, and remained a State notwithstanding that stat-
ute. The State of Texas had been indestructible. The power to
carry into effect the guaranty clause is "primarily a legislative
power, and resides in Congress," but until Congress acted the
President could make temporary provision.
42
The germ of this clause appears in the Virginia resolutions
introduced by Randolph at the outset of the Federal Convention.43
One of these is "that a republican government and the territory
of each State, except in the instance of a voluntary junction of
government and territory ought to be guaranteed by the United
States to each State."
The Convention, in June, remoulded it thus: "that a republi-
can Constitution, and its existing laws, ought to be guaranteed
to each State by the United States," and a month later put it in
this form: "that a republican form of government shall be guar-
anteed to each State." 44 The Committee on Style gave it its final
shape.
Madison, in discussing this provision in No. XLIII of the
Federalist, makes no suggestion that Congress is the only depart-
ment of government to enforce the guaranty; nor does Hamilton
in his more general reference to the same subject in No. XXI.
On principle, it would seem that every branch of the federal
government, as well as every branch of the State government, is
equally bound, when it is called to act in a matter turning upon
the effect of this provision, to accord it such effect as may be
necessary and proper to achieve its purpose.
2(1868) 7 Wall. 700, 7:9-731.
"Elliot's Debates, V, 128.
4Ibid, 182, 190, 333.
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In the most recent case in which the Supreme Court of the
United States has had occasion to comment on the clause, these
words were used:
"By the Constitution a republican form of government is guar-
anteed to every State in the Union, and the distinguishing feature
of that form is the right of the people to choose their own officers
for governmental administration, and pass their own laws in virtue
of the legislative power reposed in representative bodies, whose
legitimate acts may be said to be those of the people themselves;
but, while the people are thus the source of political power, their
governments, National and State, have been limited by written con-
stitutions, and they have themselves set bounds to their own power,
as against the sudden impulses of mere majorities." 45
Here is to be marked the emphasis placed on legitimate acts
of legislative power.
In Minor v. Happersett, a woman brought an action against a
registrar of voters in Missouri for refusing to put her name on the
list. She claimed that as a citizen of the United States, as well as
of Missouri, her right to vote could not be denied on the ground
of sex. The Supreme Court of the United States, to which the
cause came on error, said that while it was true that the United
States guaranteed a republican form of government to Missouri,
her government could not be deemed unrepublican because it ex-
cluded women from suffrage, in view of the fact that when the
Constitution was adopted every State excluded them.48
Here it is seemingly assumed that, had the court been satis-
fied that such exclusion was inconsistent with a republican form of
government, it might have reversed the judgment of the Missouri
courts.
Ex parte McCardle is another case in point. McCardle, a civil-
ian, had been arrested in Mississippi, in 1867, for trial before a
Military Commission, under the Reconstruction Acts of that year.
He claimed that these Acts were an unconstitutional attempt to set
aside constitutional State governments, republican in form, and
replace them by military governments. Such action would, of
course, be in the teeth of the constitutional guaranty now under
consideration. The court observed that, if his arrest were unlaw-
ful, he was entitled to seek judicial interposition ;47 and thereupon
'In re Duncan (i8gi) 139 U. S. 449, 461.
'(I874) 21 Wall. 162, 175.
4'(1867) 6 Wall. 3X8, 327.
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CongresS, to avoid a decision of that question, repealed the stat-
ute under which his appeal had been taken. 8
The men who framed the Constitution of the United States
advisedly used general terms, without defining them. One of these
terms was "Republican Form of Government." History had as-
signed a meaning to those words. History, as it proceeded on its
course, they knew, might somewhat enlarge that meaning, or might
somewhat restrict it. In either event, so far as History followed
the essential principles of social order in a republic, it would make
no change in substance as to the form which that order must
assume in an American State. In either event they relied on the
authority they had reposed in the different departments of the
national government to see to it that nowhere should there be a
departure from those essential principles. They looked for this
to the President in his proper sphere of activity, to the Congress
in its proper sphere of activity, to the Judiciary in its proper sphere
of activity.
The maintenanc6 of a republican form of government in every
State was a matter of vital concern both to every other, and to
the United States as a whole. Union of executive and legislative
functions, for instance, in one State, if allowed, might in course
of time be adopted in another. The principle of the Monroe doc-




s. c. (1868) 7 Wall. 5o6.
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